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Narratives of illness and offending: mentally disordered offenders’ views on their offending.   
Abstract 
Narratives have been used in both the sociology of health and illness and in criminology to examine 
how groups of people present themselves in moral terms.  This article focusses on the narratives of 
offenders with mental health problems in England subject to section 37 / 41 of the Mental Health 
Act 1983 to examine how they justified offending prior to admission.  Participants presented illness 
in a variety of different ways indicating a range of moral positions towards offending.  In line with 
previous research a first group used mental illness to excuse offending and saw themselves as 
achieving moral reform through treatment.  A second group also used illness to excuse offending, 
but did so inconsistently, seeking to mitigate responsibility whilst distancing themselves from 
treatment obligations.  A third group portrayed themselves as dishonourable both due to their 
category of offence and the type of illness experienced.  A final group rejected both labels of illness 
and offending, seeking to portray themselves as consistently moral.   
[Abstract word count – 161].   
[Word count for main article – 8336] 
 
Introduction 
Mentally disordered offenders pose a problem for the criminal justice system.  Courts are tasked 
with deciding whether an individual has committed an offence and how far they should be held 
responsible.  However, mental disorder may limit an individual’s ability to understand or weigh up 
the consequences of their actions making notions of responsibility problematic.  This paper is about 
how a group of individuals, identified by the courts as needing psychiatric treatment due to their 
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level of risk toward others, viewed their offending behaviour.  Through studying their narratives I 
examine how attitudes towards illness affected notions of responsibility.   
 
Courts in Europe and the United States have developed different ways of judging the level of 
responsibility mentally disordered offenders should hold through criminal or mental health laws 
(Hallevy, 2015).  England and Wales, where this study is based, primarily uses mental health law to 
manage this group.   The term ‘mentally disordered offenders’ is used by the Crown Prosecution 
Service to describe those who are judged to have, “a disability or disorder of the mind”, who have 
committed or are suspected of committing an offence and who have been given a hospital 
treatment order (Crown Prosecution Service, 2017).  In cases where an offender is not diverted from 
custody, a judge must decide on the degree to which they are responsible for their actions.  
Statutory law and case law has evolved since 1843 to allow offenders with mental health problems 
to be judged ‘not guilty by reason of insanity’, be seen to have ‘diminished responsibility’ for a 
homicide or be judged ‘unfit to plead’ and therefore unable to contribute toward their own defence 
(see Fennell, 2013).  Courts can choose to deal with these individuals through the criminal justice 
system where they view this as the most appropriate option.  Research indicates that mentally 
disordered offenders have a similar offending profile to offenders in prison mental health wings, 
with more than a quarter of each group have been convicted for violence, property crime or 
acquisitive offending (Thomas et al, 2007).  However, those given a hospital order are significantly 
more likely to have been convicted of a violent offence at point of trial, although are less likely to 
have been convicted of a homicide.  Qualitative evidence  indicates that judges are likely to use a 
hospital order under section 37 of the Mental Health Act 1983 (as amended by the Mental Health 
Act 2007) (MHA) (DOH, 2007) where offenders are judged by medics to be mentally disordered, 
where the offence is serious and where the statutory criteria are met (Qurashi and Shaw, 2008).  
Where judges believe the severity of an offence warrants extra steps being taken to protect the 
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public, they may impose a restriction order under section 41 of the MHA.   The effect of a restriction 
order is to make the Ministry of Justice (MOJ) responsible for decisions relating to leave, discharge 
and community supervision.  In these cases, a Responsible Clinician (normally a psychiatrist) is 
required to submit reports to the MOJ charting patient progress.  Decisions by the MOJ are informed 
by these reports.    
 
Whilst a hospital order may absolve an offender of criminal responsibility, progress through the 
forensic mental health system (which provides inpatient care for mentally disordered offenders), is 
controlled by mental health professionals including psychiatrists, psychologists, nurses, social 
workers and occupational therapists.  Professionals from these disciplines contribute to care 
planning meetings at which patient progress is monitored.  Discharge decisions are either made by 
the MOJ or a Mental Health Tribunal made up of a legal member, a medical member and a lay 
member.  Whilst psychiatric perspectives dominate within the forensic system, the views of other 
professionals inform discharge decisions.  There is, however, no clear consensus amongst 
professionals about how progress should be measured with different professions giving emphasis to 
medical, social or criminogenic risks (Davies et al, 2006).   
 
Narratives are used by individuals in order to make evaluative statements about the self.  Such 
evaluations draw on categorical identities, which are analogous to roles in society, such as parent, 
worker or spouse (Presser, 2008).   As such, narratives may be viewed as moral statements in which 
individuals reflect on how far they have fulfilled social obligations.  Offenders with mental health 
problems have to develop narratives which account for their reasons for offending, with an 
awareness of the different ways in which others may view their motivations and behaviours.  The 
purpose of this article is to focus on the narratives of offenders’ s subject to section 37 / 41 MHA 
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1983 as a means of highlighting how illness and offending are presented within talk to present a 
moral identity.  I offer a new approach towards the study of offender narratives through drawing on 
theories from both the sociology of health and illness and criminology to identify how accounts of 
offending and illness intersect.   
 
Offender and Illness narratives 
Studies of narrative within the sociology of health and illness have focussed on how language is used 
to present reality.   Work by Kleinman (1988) and Frank (1995) has given particular focus to patient 
‘voice’ outlining how illness is understood within lay accounts.  As such, these theories demonstrate 
how patients may draw on or resist dominant social discourses.  For example, Frank outlined that 
patients may give ‘restitution’ narratives, which reflect dominant discourses within medicine of 
diagnosis, professional treatment and recovery.  Alternatively, they may give ‘chaos narratives’, 
which lack a coherent structure or ‘quest narratives’ which aim to identify meaning beyond medical 
constructs.  Whilst such theory is useful in considering responses to illness, less attention has been 
paid to how individuals manage the moral dimensions of illness.  As Bury argues it is important to 
explore how narratives move beyond themes of cause and effect (or lack of them) in order to explain 
how “sufferers seek to account for and perhaps justify themselves in the altered relations of body, 
self and society brought about by illness” (2001, p. 274).  One reason that individuals may feel the 
need to justify themselves in this way is that illness identities are commonly stigmatised leading to 
the need to present ‘moral tales’ accounting for these (Blaxter, 2004).  Individuals may seek to 
present as normal, despite physical pain, because they feel a moral imperative to fulfil social roles 
(Rosenfelt and Faircloth, 2004).  Alternatively, those unable to fulfil such roles may justify their 
dependence on others through highlighting physical or emotional limitations caused by illness 
(Owen and Catalan, 2012).   In giving these accounts individuals draw on common societal 
understandings about what it means to recover from particular types of illnesses.  These may include 
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expectations that one will access appropriate treatment, remain resilient in the face of illness or 
seek not to inconvenience others (Rosenfelt and Faircloth, 2004; Owen and Catalan, 2012).   In other 
words, narratives of illness and treatment are formed with social expectations in mind.   
 
Criminology has developed different perspectives on how individuals give moral accounts.  Theorists 
from interpretivist perspectives have examined how offenders take or avoid moral ownership for 
offending through talk.   Such research has examined how offenders may use ‘neutralization 
techniques’, to deny or minimise responsibility for an offence.  This may be achieved though denial 
of responsibility, denial of injury, denial of the victim, condemning the condemners or though 
appealing to higher loyalties (Sykes and Matza, 1957).  Alternatively individuals may outline 
‘desistance’ strategies through which they highlight how they have built lives as non-offenders 
(Maruna, 2001).  Narrative criminology has extended this work through studying how language is 
used by offenders to present themselves as moral.  For example, violent offenders may give reform 
narratives, accounting for their return to a previously good identity; stability narratives, in which 
they portray themselves as consistently moral or elastic narratives in which contradictory or vague 
accounts are given and in which desistance strategies are poorly formulated (Presser, 2008).  In 
addition, offenders may seek to portray offences as excusable through referring to sub-cultural 
codes (Brookman et al, 2011) or through comparing themselves favourably to other offenders 
(Hochstetler et al, 2009).  Narratives may also be used to draw on normally stigmatising labels, such 
as a diagnosis of Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder, in order to provide a context or 
explanation for offending (Berger, 2015).   
 
People subject to section 37 / 41 of the MHA 1983 are individuals who have been identified by the 
courts as both offenders and as people suffering from a mental disorder.  As both offending and 
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illness can be understood as stigmatised identities individuals might be expected to present ‘moral 
tales’ that account for these.  Previous research has gone some way to identifying moral 
justifications given by this group.  Illness explanations dominate and are used by offenders to 
highlight a loss of ability to think and act rationally at the time of the offence (Askola et al, 2015; 
Coffey, 2012; Ferrito et al, 2012; Haggård-Grann and Gumpert, 2005).   In his research, Coffey (2012) 
noted that illness served as an ‘excuse’ (Scott and Lyman, 1958) for offenders with mental health 
problems in enabling them to identify their offence as morally wrong, whilst not taking full 
responsibility for it.  Additionally, research shows that a range of other explanations may be used to 
explain offending, namely drug and alcohol misuse, a previous criminal lifestyle or being victimised 
by others (Askola et al, 2015; Ferrito et al, 2012; Haggård-Grann and Gumpert, 2005).  Whilst current 
papers identify that both illness and environmental factors may be cited by offenders with mental 
health problems to justify offending, there has been little attention given to the extent to which 
these explanations inter-sect.  Furthermore, the extent to which different positions towards illness 
are associated with different types of moral accounts remains unexplored.  The findings presented in 
this paper focus on these issues.   
 
Methodology 
Sample 
The inclusion criteria for the study was that participants were subject to section 41 MHA 1983.   This 
meant that all participants had been identified at trial as mentally ill and that treatment and 
aftercare subject to MOJ restrictions had been deemed necessary for the protection of the public.    
Potential participants were excluded if they were due to be recalled back to hospital, were identified 
by their care co-ordinators as experiencing undue distress or if I had been involved in their care (I 
had previously worked as a social worker in a forensic unit).  A maximum variation sampling strategy 
(Bryman, 2012) enabled me to sample a range of participants by gender, ethnicity and offence type.  
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Potential participants were identified through Mental Health Act administrators and Team Managers 
within each area.  In order to maximise the sample, a number of steps were taken.  Information 
sheets were given to participants via their social supervisor (the health or social care professional 
responsible for their supervision in the community).   This explained the purpose of the study, gave 
information about the researcher, explained the potential risks and benefits of taking part and 
indicated that a £20 payment would be paid.  In instances where individuals agreed to be contacted, 
I made telephone contact and gave a further verbal explanation of the study.   At the request of the 
NHS ethics committee, a seven day ‘cooling-off’ period was given, after which a further telephone 
call was made.   Where consent was confirmed a reminder letter was sent giving details of the 
interview.  Thirty eight individuals were approached of whom 22 initially agreed to take part, with 19 
(50%) agreeing to take part after the ‘cooling-off’ period.   The majority of participants did not give a 
reason for their refusal.  Where participants did give a reason (to me or their supervisors) three 
stated that they were tired of discussing their offending histories and one stated he was too busy to 
take part.  Participants were informed that interview data would remain confidential unless they 
revealed that they planned to harm themselves or others; raised child safeguarding concerns or gave 
information about a serious offence not already on record.  Participants were also asked if they 
would be willing for the researcher to access their health and social care records to access risk 
information about them.  All participants gave signed informed consent and were willing to allow the 
researcher access to their records.  The gender balance of participants, where 2 (11%) were female 
and 17 (89%) were male, was equivalent to the restricted patient population between 1998 and 
2008 where 11-13% were female and 87-89% were male (MOJ, 2010).  All participants fell within the 
21-59 year old age bracket which accounted for 89% of admissions recorded by the MOJ in the same 
period (ibid).   MOJ statistics do not record service user ethnicity or offence type.  However, research 
by Coid et al (2000) indicates 74% of admissions to high and medium security are white, 21% black, 
3% Asian and 2% other.  The ethnic mix of participants in this study was similar with 15 (79%) being 
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white and 4 (21%) being black.   Information about participants’ age, gender, ethnicity, offence and 
legal status are given in table 1.      
[Table 1 here]. 
 
Data Collection 
The research was conducted between March 2009 and September 2011 in three mental health 
trusts in the South of England.  Ethical approval was granted by the National Health Service Research 
Ethics Committee and favourable opinion was also received from each health trust.   
There is lack of agreement amongst narrative researchers on whether interviews focussing on 
narratives should remain unstructured or not (Cohen, 2008).  Within this project I adopted a semi-
structured format.  I asked participants how they had come to be placed on section 41 MHA 1983.  I 
asked for their opinion of why others might have felt that it was necessary as well as for their own 
views on the process.  I also asked them to discuss the purpose of the restriction order, their 
subsequent conditions and the degree to which these structures affected their interactions with 
others.  I used non-verbal cues and interpreting questions (Kvale, 1996) to encourage participants to 
expand on their answers and to check my understanding was correct.  The length of interviews 
varied with the shortest being 20 minutes and the longest being 100 minutes.  Interviews were 
recorded and later transcribed by a professional transcription service.   
 
Analysis 
Transcripts were initially coded on paper and the codes entered into Nvivo to aid organisation of 
these data.  I used a ‘code and retrieve’ method to identify common phenomena, collect examples 
of these phenomena and to identify common themes and patterns within these data as well as 
exceptional cases (Siedel and Kelle, 1995).   In conducting my analysis I aimed to examine both what 
I was told and its function (Coffey and Atkinson, 1996).  Thus, the analysis focussed particularly on 
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the discourses individuals adopted to discuss both offending and illness and the degree to which 
these intersected.  In presenting participant narratives, I have been mindful of criticisms made 
against narrative research by Atkinson (2009).  That is, the temptation for researchers to prioritise 
dramatic accounts over plain ones.  Consequently I have focussed on both plain and dramatic 
descriptions and the degree to which these are used to do moral work.     
 
Findings  
Participants’ position towards illness formed a central part of all narratives.  In the following section I 
set out these different positions and how they affected explanations of offending.    
 
Acceptance of illness and treatment as a moral reform strategy 
A first group of participants offered narratives which highlighted how they accepted a diagnosis of 
mental illness as an explanation for their offending and were morally reformed through treatment or 
rehabilitation.   Moral reform in these cases was associated with a range of treatment or behavioural 
strategies which might enable them to return to a previously good identity.  These narratives were 
offered by nine individuals within the sample.  Towards the beginning of interviews I told offenders 
that I was interested to find out how they came to be subject to section 37 / 41 MHA 1983.  
Participants in this category responded to this question by offering narratives in which their legal 
status as mentally disordered offenders was highlighted.  For example Neil gave the following 
account: 
Neil: His [the judge’s] words were, ‘I can see what clearly went wrong…’ 
Interviewer: Right. 
Neil: ‘…You need to be hospitalised’… 
Interviewer: OK 
Neil: “…and I’m giving you a section 37 / 41’. 
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In line with others in this group Neil drew on the words of an authority figure to support his claim as 
an offender with a mental health problem.  The statement by the judge was used to highlight that he 
had not been at fault for the offence because he had been diagnosed as mentally ill and was in need 
of treatment.   
 
Although individuals in this group identified themselves as ill this did not mean that they discussed 
the nature of that illness in detail.  Two participants named their diagnoses as paranoid 
schizophrenia and depression, whilst others referred more generally to ‘mental illness’ or ‘illness’.  
Within narratives, illness was positioned as a biological disorder that might affect anybody.  Illness 
was identified as something that might overwhelm an individual, leading to a loss of rational 
thought.  Because it was seen as beyond an individual’s control it was cited as a form of mitigation 
for offending.  For example Adam stated: 
“I’m just a guy who got ill and did something stupid that I wouldn’t have done in my right 
state of mind”. 
Whilst illness was used by participants to explain the offence, moral reform was described in two 
ways.  A first group, made up of five participants, focussed on the need to accept treatment.  Within 
these narratives individuals identified accepting professional intervention as being central, even 
where the nature of the illness was poorly defined.   These narratives focussed on how individuals 
had worked with mental health staff to identify treatment plans.  Some participants described co-
operating with mental health staff from the outset, whilst others indicated that they had learnt the 
importance of co-operation over time.  In both cases, psychiatric treatment was identified as a 
central strategy for avoiding future offending.   For example, when asked to reflect on the likelihood 
of offending in the future Richard said: 
“I think now because I am taking the medicine I am calmer now so I won’t be committing 
any crimes and won’t be taking drugs.  It is because of the medication I’m taking”. 
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Participants in this group positioned taking medication as the principle way of avoiding future 
offending on the basis that it controlled the symptoms of their illness.  However, these explanations 
also acted to shield them from examining their offending behaviour more broadly.  For example, in 
Richard’s case, the impression was given that biological illness had been directly responsible for his 
offending behaviour.  However, when questioned further he identified that he believed that had 
been unwell for three years and that his offending behaviour dated back “ten to fifteen years” and 
included a serious assault, leading to a prison sentence.    
 
A second group, made up of three participants, described moral reform in more complex ways.  
Whilst these participants accepted that they had suffered from an illness, their narratives differed in 
that alternative explanations to illness were also highlighted and explored.  For example, Michael 
highlighted a range of factors that might lead to offending including his housing situation, boredom, 
experiencing racism from others and poor relationships with medical and social supervisors.   As a 
consequence of this, strategies aimed at avoiding re-offending that were named by this group were 
also broader.  Moral reform for these participants was seen to rely not only on support from mental 
health services, but also on housing stability, regular activity, and support from family.   
 
Contradictory accounts of illness  
Three participants in my sample gave narratives in which concepts of illness were used in 
contradictory ways.  There was no overlap between participants in this group and those in other 
categories.  In line with those describing moral reform through treatment, these participants 
focussed on how others came to identify them as mentally ill and how illness reduced responsibility 
for offending.  However, these participants did not use illness explanations consistently.  These 
inconsistencies were demonstrated in two ways.  First, one participant denied that he had been ill, 
but later used illness as mitigation.  Ian said:  
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“The first time they [mental health professionals] said I had a psychosis or schizophrenia but 
I never believed that.   I never hear voices or had hallucinations and I wasn’t psychotic.  It 
was because I was informing on paedophiles at the time…and they tried to attack me…” 
Despite indicating that he had never heard voices or experienced hallucinations, Ian went on to use 
illness as mitigation when referring to a later incident where he had threatened four people with a 
knife.  Whilst dismissing the incident as “a joke” Ian also raised psychosis as a possible explanation 
saying: 
“Maybe I was psychotic again. Cannabis makes me ill, makes you hear voices and 
hallucinate”. 
Here, Ian moved away from using the personal pronoun ‘I’ when describing the effects of cannabis, 
stating that cannabis “makes you hear voices and hallucinate”.  The use of more impersonal 
language when describing psychotic symptoms acted to distance him from the label of illness, as 
drug-induced psychosis was presented as a general effect of the drug.  Second, two participants 
stated that they were ill at the time of the offence, but went on to question this later in the 
narrative.   Lamal used a diagnosis of mental illness to explain his assault on a police officer, noting 
that he had not been “in his right mind” and “mentally ill”.  However, he went on to say: 
“Yeah, but the police officer one [offence] I was not thinking because all I wanted to do that 
day was to go to my brother’s house and plus they [hospital staff] gave me drugs.  And when 
you’re on drugs, their drugs, their medication, yeah, it’s paranoia when you’re outside.  
Because, when you get addicted to it, yeah, it becomes paranoia when you need their 
drugs”.    
In this narrative, illness was seen to arise from psychiatric treatment, with mental health 
professionals being seen as responsible for the offence through enforcing it.  By contrast Daniel 
argued that he had been ill at the time of the offence, but went on to question whether treatment 
had actually affected his recovery, noting that he had only been made subject to a “small dose” of 
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medication.  Within the narratives of these participants illness was used to mitigate their 
responsibility for offending, although professional definitions of illness were also questioned.  Whilst 
this produced narratives that were contradictory, the narrative techniques allowed participants to 
claim mitigation for offending whilst rejecting stigmatising labels of illness.   
 
Ill but dishonourable Identities 
Two participants in my study described having dishonourable identities.  These participants were 
aware that they had been diagnosed as mentally ill but were distinct from the previous two 
categories of participants in that illness was cited as affecting their behaviour but was not used as 
mitigation.  Whilst they acknowledged that a label of mental illness might provide mitigation in the 
legal sense, they continued to present themselves as dishonourable people.  Both individuals 
identified themselves as having continuing urges to hurt others.  Sally described an ongoing fantasy 
to harm others with knives.  She had handed in a number of knives to her mental health team, but 
reported that she continued to carry them, although she would leave them in her car when going to 
the health centre.  She said: 
“It’s a comfort if you have a knife. It’s not to protect myself, not that sort of comfort.  It’s a 
power thing as well. I can do this [stab people] and you can’t stop me”. 
Her continuing fantasies to harm others were outlined throughout the interview.  She also 
highlighted an ongoing wish to harm herself.  Thus, a label of illness was acknowledged by Sally, but 
was not seen to mitigate against the stigma of offending due to the limited effects that she believed  
the treatment had.  In addition, participants in this group believed that certain types of offences 
were so serious that illness did not serve to reduce the effects of stigma.  Oliver, who had a history 
of sexual offending against children said: 
“It’s like when you do something extremely wrong, dangerous; you hurt children, that 
aspect.   That’s the low of the low thing in the eyes of the public.  Forget murder, arson 
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anything like that.  Crimes against children is the low of the low, the bottom of the heap.  
That’s how I look at it and that’s the way society sees it”.  
Thus, whilst receiving and accepting a diagnosis, Oliver gave prominence to the stigma of being a 
paedophile throughout his account.  Furthermore, his narrative highlighted that he had internalised 
dominant social values about sexual offending.    
 
Rejection of illness 
Within my sample, five participants rejected a diagnosis of mental illness in their narratives.  For this 
group, illness was not identified as something that might be presented in a benign fashion.  Rather, it 
was viewed as something that threatened to permanently discredit their identity.  For example, 
Frances complained about the content of a psychiatric report because: 
“…it made me look a totally incompetent person totally being unable to know what was 
going on, that I was too mentally ill to know what was going on….”   
As all individuals in this group rejected that they were ill, they needed to explain why professionals 
felt differently.  Four individuals accounted for this through constructing their own definitions of 
mental illness and identifying how they compared to these.   
In giving these explanations, they drew on medical language but questioned its meaning.  For 
example Frances stated: 
“…everyone’s a bit mental in every sector and they gets panic attacks and aggravated.  I 
don’t get aggravated but some people do.  I don’t get irritable, I just get depressed.  If I’m 
mentally ill then all it is is that I’m nervous and a bit of panic attack.  I’m not psychotic, not 
[more] paranoid than anybody else, not [more] depressed than anybody else so really that 
makes me normal even when they’re calling me mentally ill”. 
In giving this explanation, Frances referred to a number of common mental health problems such as 
depression and anxiety.  He identified himself as suffering from these, thereby aligning himself with 
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members of the ‘ordinary’ population.  In doing so, Frances attempted to downgrade the status of 
the label of mental illness that he had been given, but also noted problems with this.  Within his 
account, he identified that mental health staff could force medication on individuals with a mental 
illness, despite them not being a risk towards others.   A diagnosis of mental illness was thereby seen 
as something which might be viewed as normal but which might also pose problems, due to mental 
health laws which applied to the general population.  In line with Frances’ account the narratives of 
participants in this group had a moral purpose in establishing them as normal compared to the 
population as a whole.  Additionally, such narratives were used by participants to highlight wider 
injustices within the mental health system.   
 
Participants in this group sought to resist labels of mental disorder.  However, this presented them 
with a dilemma.  Progress through the forensic mental health system was seen by participant to be 
dependent on them admitting that they had a mental disorder as a prerequisite of discharge.   
Despite this, participants in this group chose to resist their diagnosis.  For example Phillip identified 
that others within the hospital had encouraged him to fake agreement with mental health staff in 
order to achieve discharge.  However, he stated that it “was important to maintain what I felt was 
real and the truth”.   Other participants in this category also gave accounts, in which telling the truth 
as they saw it, was a matter beyond negotiation.  Within these accounts, participants highlighted 
how their continued position had led to mental health staff being more flexible in their approach.  
Phillip went onto say,  
“The doctor said to me, Phillip, she said, as long as you understand what we’re saying, that 
we think this [that you have a mental illness]…but you’re saying another thing.  As long as 
we understand each other’s ideas then we can work together.  Obviously you’re really well 
and everything’s going great so we can back you for a discharge”. 
Through maintaining their position that they did not have a serious mental health problem, 
participants identified that they had upheld their personal integrity.  Whilst taking this position was 
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not without risk, participants identified the possibility that they might uphold their own definitions 
of why they had offended.  In contrast to other participants, individuals in this category did not use a 
diagnosis of illness to mitigate against offending.  They did however question their culpability in 
other ways.  Individuals rejecting illness were clear that they had attacked others but sought to 
justify why they had done so.  An exception to this was Vic, who stated that he could not remember 
his offence, although he expressed doubt that he had committed it.  Three of the participants 
explained their offences through claiming that others had attacked them first, either verbally, 
physically or through taking property.  Offences were therefore seen as self-defence.  For example, 
Quentin claimed that a supermarket chain and the council [local government] had been trying to 
take items from his property with help from the police.  He said: 
“I threatened the police and I threatened the council and said if you come on my property 
and take my stuff I will maim one of you.  And they chased me around and I went to beat 
one of the police up and the council official and they had me dragged away. [I] tried to stop 
them taking my stuff”. 
Violence was therefore seen to be justified on the grounds that he was “doing what was natural” 
though defending his own rights and those of his family.   Similarly, other participants in this group 
acknowledged their offences, but claimed that actions by others absolved them of blame.   
 
Discussion 
The study had a number of limitations.  The size of the sample was small due to those subject to 
section 37 / 41 MHA being a difficult to reach population and the refusal rate was 50%.  
Nonetheless, my approach does offer a new way of viewing how offenders with mental health 
problems understand their offending behaviour.   
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Research into offender narratives has focussed on the degree to which they accept or reject 
responsibility for their offending.  In line with other research participants, offenders use speech to 
position themselves as moral agents (Atkinson and Coffey, 2003, p.116).   As offending carries a 
powerful stigma, offenders have to work hard to convince others that they have adopted desistance 
strategies or that the label that they have been given is unjust.  Offenders who have been given a 
diagnosis of mental illness are doubly stigmatised in that they have been identified both as offenders 
and people who are mentally ill.  As previous research has found, these individuals may use illness to 
justify or excuse offending.  However, current research underplays the variety of positions that this 
group adopts towards illness.  These positions are important because they impact on offenders’ 
moral justifications for their actions and subsequent reform strategies.   
 
In line with Coffey’s (2012) research a group of offenders in my study highlighted mental disorder as 
their main reason for offending.  A key aspect within narratives was how others had come to 
recognise that they had been mentally ill.  In drawing on the accounts of doctors and judges, 
participants sought to establish normative frameworks through which their offending should be 
judged.  Specifically, they drew attention to how mental disorder diminished legal responsibility.  
Descriptions of the trial and events leading up to it were used as a ‘strategic device’ (Hyden, 1997) to 
highlight that they belonged to a particular category of person, lacking responsibility for their 
actions.  Illness was cited as a ‘biographical disruption’ (Bury, 1982), being used to explain a shift 
from a ‘well’ to an ‘ill’ identity.  Whilst diagnostic descriptions were rarely used, plain descriptions of 
‘mental illness’ or ‘illness’ were employed to signal agreement with medical models.  Descriptions 
reflected either a ‘broken brain’ model (Andreason, 1984) or a bio-psycho-social understanding 
(Engel, 1989).  In taking these positions participants signalled that their diagnosis was not a matter of 
choice being primarily biological in origin.  Illness was therefore viewed as a phenomenon which 
suspended personal agency but which might be addressed through treatment.  Having established 
legal mitigation, participants felt it necessary to account for how they had achieved moral reform 
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through identifying how they had recovered from illness.   Summarising Cox (1976) Adshead et al 
have argued that recovery for forensic patients consists of, “a narrative shift from, ‘I didn’t do it’ to, 
‘I did it but I was mentally ill’ to ‘I did it’” (2015, p.77).  They theorise that this involves patients 
acknowledging illness, whilst taking responsibility for offending on the basis that psychotic beliefs 
may reflect deeper motivations.  In contrast to these theories, participants in this category used 
illness to neutralize the stigma of offending (taking a, ‘I did it but I was mentally ill’ position).  
However, this did not mean that moral reform was seen as unnecessary by this group.   These 
individuals s provided what Presser (2008) has referred to as ‘reform narratives’, in that they 
outlined strategies adopted to return to a previously good moral self.  However, in the case of the 
first group of participants who aligned moral reform with accepting treatment, these strategies were 
bio-medical in nature.  Through using restitution narratives, this group signalled that they had 
accepted prescribed treatments and that this had led to a remission of symptoms.  A return to a 
good identity was therefore firmly aligned with accepting treatment, in line with dominant 
professional narratives in forensic care (Davies et al, 2006).  Furthermore, stopping treatment was 
connected to the possibility of relapse and a return to the ‘bad self’.   The retention of personal 
agency was therefore seen to be dependent on psychiatric medication.  Acceptance of medical 
treatment was associated with moral reform because participants believed it enabled them to make 
clear decisions about offending in the future.  This emphasis on treatment was positioned by 
participants as making explorations of deeper motivations at the time of the offence unnecessary.    
 
Whilst a second group of participants in this category described moral reform through reference to 
both medical and social factors, this reform was also heavily associated with medical treatment.  
Accepting treatment was seen as an important first step in moral reform in enabling participants to 
regain their agency.  However, acceptance of treatment itself was seen as insufficient.  Rather, 
participants identified the need to attend to interactional and structural reasons for offending 
through a focus on their personal relationships and social circumstances.  Whilst restitution 
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narratives were used by some to signal a return to a moral self, descriptions of illness were not used 
consistently by all.   
 
Frank (1995) has used the notion of ‘chaos narratives’ to describe stories by sufferers in which 
doctors are unable to understand their illness or to treat it effectively.   Those using concepts of 
illness inconsistently here did signal a lack of faith in treatment.  However, their narratives can be 
better understood as ‘elastic narratives’ (Presser, 2008) in that illness was used flexibly to launch 
claims and counterclaims about the moral self.  In line with the first group of participants, individuals 
in this category used illness to signal that they were not morally responsible for offending.   
However, in contrast to that group, they also used additional neutralization techniques (Matza and 
Sykes, 1957).  Participants denied injury through presenting threats to others as ‘a joke’ and 
condemned the condemners through describing forced medication as the reason for offending.   
These explanations were used to deny responsibility for the offence at points at which they denied 
or expressed ambivalent views towards illness.  Whilst contradictory, these techniques enabled 
them to question whether they should take treatment as advised by doctors, in contrast to implicit 
social assumptions associated with restitution narratives.   
 
Whilst illness may be used to mitigate responsibility for offending, this strategy is not used 
universally by all.  In relation to sex offenders, Hudson (2011) notes that offenders are prone to 
mirror the views of wider society, placing offenders in a hierarchy with sex offenders at the bottom.  
In a similar way, participants giving ill but dishonourable identities referred to either offending or 
illness hierarchies, placing themselves at the bottom.  In Oliver’s case, his identity as a paedophile 
was then seen to invalidate claims that illness might mitigate responsibility for offending.  These 
views drew on opinion from both professionals and patients who had questioned his place in the 
system.  In line with these views, he categorised himself as immoral.  In addition, both participants in 
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this category identified themselves as suffering from a personality disorder.   This diagnosis has been 
identified as stigmatised within the mental health system, due to beliefs by some psychiatrists that 
medical treatment is ineffective for this group (Sulzer, 2015).  Participants in this group showed an 
awareness of the status of their diagnosis and also shared the view that treatments for the condition 
were ineffective.  Consequently, they did not view treatment as a route through which they could 
return to a good self.    
 
Previous research into the narratives of offenders with mental health problems has focussed on the 
way that they use illness to reduce the stigma of offending.  However, this research has largely 
neglected offenders who might reject a label of illness.  In some senses this is surprising, as narrative 
research has highlighted that individuals may resist diagnostic labels for some time.  Individuals may 
resist psychiatric diagnosis because they reject mental illness as a concept, because they believe that 
their diagnosis does not fully describe their experience or because they wish to avoid the stigma 
associated with mental illness (Cohen, 2008).  Subsequent resistance may be demonstrated through 
increased personal assertiveness or through political activism (Gray, 2001).  Resistance does, 
however, carry certain dangers for those subject to section 37/41 MHA because the order is 
designed to function as a social control measure.   Coercive mechanisms within mental health policy 
can be viewed as a form of ‘normalisation’ in that they are designed to encourage patients to 
internalise dominant values about health.  Resistance by service users may therefore be interpreted 
as evidence of ‘non-compliant’ or ‘risky’ behaviour by mental health staff which may lead to the use 
of further controls.  Service users may therefore regulate how they communicate with staff or may 
display resistance in subtle ways in order to be assessed as ‘low risk’ (Coffey, 2011; Reynolds et al, 
2014).  Participants in my research however, were more overt in their resistance to professional 
perspectives.  Those rejecting a diagnosis of mental illness in my study associated mental illness with 
incompetence or violence and believed that others viewed it similarly.  Whilst they acknowledged 
that they had received a diagnosis, they sought to use what Thoits (2011) refers to as ‘deflection 
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techniques’ to limit stigma.  They did this through defining their problems in terms less stigmatising 
than their perceived image of mental illness.  Specifically, they portrayed themselves as having 
experienced distress but associated this with either the pressures or everyday life or the actions of 
mental health staff.  This then affected their narratives of offending.  Those within this category all 
gave what Presser (2008) has termed ‘stability narratives’, in which they presented themselves as 
having a consistently good moral identity through life as a whole.  In order to maintain this stance, 
this group used common neutralization techniques to explain their offending.  In taking this position, 
participants saw themselves as maintaining moral integrity.  However, in line with offenders subject 
to section 41 in Coffey’s (2011, 2013) research, these offenders recognised that challenging the 
system had particular costs.  Specifically, participants saw resistance as having lengthened their time 
in hospital and also recognised that it might lengthen supervision in the community.  Nonetheless, 
these actions were seen to have prompted a degree of accommodation by mental health staff who 
were forced to work around these narratives.   
 
Conclusion 
People identified by courts as ‘mentally disordered offenders’ are seen as both patients who need to 
be treated and as offenders who need to be managed.   Before release, offenders are required to 
give accounts about how they have recovered from illness and how they will avoid future offending.    
This article has added to previous knowledge through identifying how the different positions 
offenders diagnosed with mental health problems hold towards illness are used to reflect a moral 
identity.  In line with previous research, the majority of participants in this study used illness to 
reduce responsibility for offending.  Closer attention to these narratives reveals that two different 
positions may follow on from this.  First, individuals may signal compliance with treatment as a 
central reform strategy.  Second, they may use concepts of illness in an elastic way to both mitigate 
responsibility for offending and to question their own obligation to engage with treatment.   
However, a diagnosis of illness was not used to excuse offending by all.  A third category of 
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participants identified themselves as being immoral due to both the type of offence that they had 
committed and their diagnosis.  A final category sought to define themselves as moral through 
seeking to explain their offending as justified whilst also rejecting a diagnosis of mental illness.   
 
A number of issues might be addressed through future research.  Criminological research has 
identified that female offenders are more likely than men to relate their offending to domestic 
incidents or power imbalances (Jack, 1999).  As only two participants in my research were female, it 
was difficult to draw conclusions from their accounts.  However, further research focussing on 
female offenders with mental health problems has the potential to reveal a different set of 
narratives.  Furthermore, it is worth noting that the participants in this study had been treated 
within the forensic mental health system for long periods of time.  Prisoners with mental health  will 
be subject to different discourses about rehabilitation and treatment.   Narrative research 
conducted with this group may reveal different themes due to the group being less likely to have 
committed a violent offence at point of trial (Thomas, McCrone and Fahy, 2009) and also due to 
different rehabilitative ideals within the prison system.  The findings are of relevance to the forensic 
mental health system.   Narratives identify people’s beliefs towards their circumstances.  In addition 
to providing explanations for action, they also identify strong ideals which infer patterns of action 
and behaviour at group levels (Cohen, 2015).  As the forensic mental health system is concerned 
with moral reform, it is important for professionals within the system to understand how offending 
may be justified by users within these settings.  This research indicates that whilst an acceptance of 
illness was felt to be useful by some participants, it also acted to limit reflection in some cases.  
However, it also indicated that many offenders refer to illness in flexible ways or do not use it to 
justify offending at all.  This indicates that a broader range of strategies need developing to enable 
offenders with mental health problems to consider their actions and how they might avoid offending 
in the future.    
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Table 1 - Details of Participants 
Pseudonym 
of Participant 
Gender Age Ethnicity Index Offence Legal Status 
Adam Male 35 White UK Manslaughter Conditional discharge 
Ben Male 39 Black 
British 
Assault and Actual Bodily 
Harm 
Conditional Discharge 
Christopher Male 53 White UK Actual Bodily Harm Conditional Discharge 
Daniel Male 59 White UK Manslaughter Conditional Discharge 
Eric Male 40 White UK Arson Deferred Conditional 
Discharge (after having 
been recalled from a 
Conditional Discharge) 
Francis Male 45 White UK Actual bodily harm and 
criminal damage 
Conditional Discharge 
Grace Female 45 White UK Arson Conditional Discharge 
Henry Male 55 White UK Arson and burglary Conditional Discharge 
Ian Male 36 White UK Actual bodily harm Detained under section 
37/41 MHA 1983 (after 
having been recalled 
from a Conditional 
Discharge) 
Lamal Male 26 African Actual Bodily Harm Detained in hospital 
under section 37/41 
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MHA 1983. 
Michael Male 52 African-
Caribbean 
Manslaughter Conditional Discharge 
Neil Male 38 Black 
British 
Manslaughter Conditional Discharge 
Oliver Male 49 White UK Legal category of offence 
missing from file, although 
professional reports make 
reference to a ‘sexual 
offence’. 
Conditional Discharge 
Phillip Male 31 White UK Malicious wounding Conditional Discharge 
Quentin Male 47 White UK Actual Bodily Harm Conditional Discharge 
Richard Male 34 White 
European 
Wounding and Grievous 
Bodily Harm 
Conditional Discharge 
Sally Female 39 White UK Affray and Criminal damage Conditional Discharge 
Tony Male 35 White UK Common assault Conditional Discharge 
Vic Male 36 White UK Actual Bodily Harm Deferred Conditional 
Discharge 
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